Days of Valor Page 4
LTC Schroeder breathed a sigh of relief as he directed his company commanders to search and secure the areas surrounding the LZs before forming a battalion perimeter. He was not surprised when the grunts found unoccupied enemy bunkers, trenches, caches of rice, and other evidence of enemy presence within a few hundred meters of the LZs.
As the rifle companies began to dig in to form the battalion perimeter, CH-47s from the 478th Heavy Helicopter Company began to arrive with the artillery. Charlie Battery, 2/40th Artillery’s howitzers were sling loaded beneath the giant cargo helicopters. The rotor wash of the hovering CH-47s kicked up swirling clouds of dust and dirt as the Chinooks hovered downward until their loads were on the ground. The cargo straps were then released from the hooks dangling from beneath the bellies of the ships, and free of their loads, the powerful two-engine Chinooks gained altitude and flew off to pick up additional loads. As the Chinooks lifted off, artillerymen ran through the maelstrom of swirling sand and dust and quickly manhandled their howitzers into firing positions. Red and white aiming stakes were then placed in front of each howitzer, laying them in for registration.
Additional CH-47 sorties lifted in coiled rolls of concertina wire, steel engineer stakes, bundles of sandbags, and pre-fabricated bunkers. As Lieutenant Wayne Morris of Alpha Company described the scene, “With the Flying Crane [CH-54] lifting in a bulldozer and other heavy equipment, Hueys and gunships everywhere, soldiers swarming in all directions in the dust…I remember my amazement at the organized confusion underway.” The Warrior battalion soon had over 500 men on the ground at Firebase Nashua, and more were on the way. Everyone wanted to be dug in with overhead cover by nightfall.
Around 1500 hours, a platoon of Delta Troop, 17th Cav rumbled into the FSB Nashua with a portion of the battalion trains. The convoy had moved by unpaved road from Fire Support Base Hanover, a distance of some twelve kilometers, without incident. During the days that followed, the cavalrymen would have to fight to keep the overland route to Fire Base Nashua open.
The grunts were glad to see Delta Troop’s ACAVs, as they pulled into firing positions around the perimeter. With their high silhouettes, the armored vehicles were tempting targets for enemy RPGs, but each track’s .50 caliber machine gun and two 7.62 machine guns added a significant amount of firepower to the battalion perimeter. As the Cav troopers strung concertina wire in front of their positions, the infantrymen continued to improve their fighting positions. The Warrior platoon leaders checked and re-checked their platoons’ defensive preparations. They insured that their M60 machine guns were positioned to provide interlocking fields of fire across their platoon frontages. Additionally, they made sure that each fighting position had two Claymore mines positioned at least 16 meters to the front of the position.
The Claymore was detonated by a handheld electrical firing device. When fired, the mine blasted the area to its front with 700 spherical steel balls. It was 100 percent lethal to anyone within a 50 meter range, and it was moderately effective out to a range of 100 meters. Further to the front, the grunts rigged trip flares in the wire entanglements. Beyond the wire, in front of most platoon positions, there was fifty to a hundred meters of relatively open area with some low scrub brush and weeds. Fire Base Nashua was not an easy objective for an enemy ground assault, but it was not unassailable, particularly to enemy sappers who were adept at slipping through firebase perimeters with satchel charges and destroying artillery pieces and command bunkers.
As a precautionary measure, LTC Schroeder directed Captain Bob Eaton’s Bravo Company to establish an inner perimeter to protect the artillery, mortars and battalion TOC. Eaton’s company was also designated battalion reserve with the mission of counterattacking and destroying any enemy that managed to penetrate the FSB’s outer defenses.
As twilight approached, the Charlie battery’s howitzers and the battalion’s mortar platoons completed firing their registrations. On-call defensive concentrations were plotted all around the perimeter. FSB Nashua was as well prepared as it could be for a new firebase.
LTC Schroeder decided to have one last walk around the battalion perimeter before darkness fell. The firebase was still a work in progress, but his men were well dug in on the outer perimeter. In the Alpha Company sector on the southeast side of the firebase, a new lieutenant in a clean set of jungle fatigues and shined boots saluted him. Schroeder reminded the lieutenant that it was “downright dangerous” to salute an officer in the field, since enemy snipers were on the lookout for high-value targets. Lieutenant Morris was embarrassed, but he would not make the same mistake again.
After walking the perimeter and satisfying himself that adequate preparations had been made for the night’s defense, Schroeder and King met with the company commanders to update them on the most recent intelligence, and the plan of operations for the following day. The Warrior commander wanted his battalion to maintain an offensive posture.
LTC Schroeder had a number of concerns. First, he felt that he wasn’t getting timely information from the LRP teams that were under his operational control. He asked the LRP commander, Major Maus, to meet with him at Fire Base Nashua the following morning. He was also concerned about a bunker complex found by A Troop 3/17th Cav less than two kilometers northeast of Nashua. The Cav troopers did not find any enemy at the site, but the area looked suspicious. Schroeder gave his Echo Company CO, Captain Stan McLaughlin, the mission of checking the area out further on the next day.
While McLaughlin’s company patrolled north of Nashua, Captain Donald Drees’ Alpha Company was to reconnoiter to the south. Charlie Company, commanded by Captain Ronald Jones (not his real name), was instructed by Schroeder to complete work on their sector of the perimeter and patrol northwest of the firebase. Schroeder then instructed Captain Eaton to complete work on the inner perimeter and provide security for the combat engineers who were constructing a trench and berm. Schroeder reminded his commanders that he’d ordered a stand-to for 0600 hours the next morning. At stand-to, all of the men on the perimeter were required to be in full battle dress manning their fighting positions.
LTC Schroeder and Major King planned to continue saturation patrolling in the area around Fire Base Nashua, pushing out farther each day. When the immediate area around the base was cleared, he planned to initiate company-size airmobile operations throughout the AO to interdict enemy movement and to destroy major VC/NVA forces that were operating in this portion of War Zone D. After receiving their missions for the following day, Schroeder’s battle captains returned to their companies.
The Warrior battalion commander was pleased with the professionalism that his battalion displayed that day. The battalion-sized airmobile insertion had gone like clockwork without a hitch, and work on the new firebase was progressing well. He knew that 4/12th Infantry ranked among the best combat battalions in Vietnam, and was confident that they would meet any challenge they faced with courage and fortitude. He had no idea, however, that in the next 48 hours, the Warrior battalion would face its greatest challenge since landing at Vung Tau some twelve months prior.
All was quiet along the perimeter of Fire Base Nashua that night. The rifle company night ambush patrols and listening posts (LPs) were positioned on the likely avenues of approach to the perimeter to provide early warning of an attack. The patrols and LPs remained alert, uneasy in their new environment. All they heard were the night sounds of the jungle.
Things were not so quiet for the LRPs. Four kilometers south of Nashua, Major Maus’ LRP Team 13 reported that an enemy unit, estimated at company size, had settled around them for the night. The news was unsettling to RTOs Mangai and Dowd manning the battalion radios in the TOC. They informed the duty officer who in turn informed the battalion S3, Major Ed King. King took the report and instructed the duty officer to report the information to Brigade. He was not alarmed, since the LRPs had not called for assistance or extraction. If they were in serious trouble, they would call for artillery and gunship support and haul ass for the neare
st extraction LZ. In this case they had not. The remainder of the night was uneventful.
5 December 1967
At first light, LRP Team 13 slipped quietly out of their night position and moved slowly southward. The six-man team moved stealthily through the vines and bushes along an intermittent streambed, moving ten meters, then stopping and listening before moving again. The jungle air was heavy and no breeze was stirring. Meanwhile, two additional LRP teams were about to be inserted to the north and northwest of the fire base. Team 23 was inserted shortly after 0630, followed by Team 27 at 0700 hours. With these insertions, Major Maus had four teams on the ground looking for the enemy. It did not take long to find them.
LRP team 13 was the first to report a sighting. They saw four armed VC moving east to west in front of their position some four kilometers south of Fire Base Nashua. The team leader reported the sighting, then continued moving south.
At 0845 hours, LRP Team 25, led by Sergeant Alexander, made contact with a platoon-size enemy force two kilometers east of Team 13’s location. While moving through the dense jungle the point man, Specialist Four Dan Lindsey, spotted six VC advancing in line formation toward the patrol’s location. Lindsey knew that the team’s mission was to monitor and report enemy movement, not to engage in a firefight, but it was too late. The VC had spotted him. Recognizing the need for immediate action, he opened fire, killing two of the enemy. The remainder of the VC platoon returned the fire, and Lindsey went down with a serious leg wound. Dropping to the ground, he crawled back to his patrol’s position where, along with his teammates, he continued to fire on the advancing enemy while the patrol leader, Sergeant Alexander, radioed for artillery, air support, and a medevac. The LRP team was outnumbered and in serious trouble.
Five minutes after he received the report, Major Maus was aboard his C&C ship headed for the LRPs’ location. The team had to be extracted before they were overrun. Under the cover of artillery fire, the patrol broke contact and began to move toward an extraction zone carrying the badly wounded Specialist Lindsey. As the LRPs made their way toward the LZ, an extraction ship flew at max speed over the triple canopy jungle. After reaching the LZ, Alexander’s team popped a smoke grenade to signal the UH-1D that they were prepared for extraction. Artillery fire kept the VC at bay. When the Huey dropped down into the tiny LZ, the team raced for the ship carrying their wounded comrade just as the VC arrived and began to fire. As the slick lifted off, the M60 door gunners blazed away at the enemy, hitting two. AK-47 rounds riddled the UH-1 as it lifted off. Gaining altitude, the pilot headed for the 93th Evacuation Hospital at Long Binh at maximum speed. It was a race against time. Dan Lindsey did not complete the race. He’d lost too much blood and died before the helicopter touched down on the hospital’s landing pad. F Company, 51st LRP lost their first man, and he was one of their best.
Captain Stan McLaughlin’s Echo Company headed north out of the fire base perimeter at around 0800 hours. McLaughlin, USMA 1964, was in his fourth month of command. He took command of Echo Company after the previous commander was killed on a hot LZ the previous August. His impact on Echo Company was soon noticeable. By the time the Company arrived at FSB Nashua it was arguably the best rifle company in the Warrior battalion.
A combat tracker team consisting of a dog and handler from the 49th Scout Dog Platoon accompanied McLaughlin’s patrol. If there were enemy in the area, he wanted to find them before they found Echo Company. He knew that the Air Cav and LRPs had spotted enemy soldiers and bunkers north of Nashua, and the risk of an enemy ambush weighed heavily on his mind.
Working their way cautiously northward, McLaughlin’s lead platoons stayed east of a stream called Suoi Dia paralleling a trail. Every hundred meters the rifle platoons halted and sent out cloverleaf patrols in all directions to insure that they were not marching into an ambush. The point men carefully skirted cleared areas that were overgrown with waist-high elephant grass, and spotted with huge chest-high anthills. The enemy usually posted spotters to observe such areas, and they were perfect locations for L-shaped ambushes. Typically the enemy would conceal themselves along tree lines forming the long and short axis of the “L,” with the clearing in the middle. Any unit crossing the clearing would be caught in the open and exposed to both frontal and flanking fire, a deadly situation.
Shortly after noon, Echo Company found a newly cut trail through the jungle and began to follow it. A point man and the combat tracker team moved cautiously forward. The dog sensed the presence of the VC before the point man and alerted on the enemy. Six VC were walking on the trail directly toward Echo Company. The company’s lead squad opened up on the VC to cover the withdrawal of the point man and the tracker team. One of the VC managed to throw an armed 82mm mortar round, rigged as a hand grenade, at the handler and his dog. The round exploded, showering both with shrapnel. The handler survived, but the dog did not. The VC then melted back into the jungle while Echo Company called for a dust-off. McLaughlin was convinced that there must be an enemy base camp nearby. He would continue to patrol the area, but moved with extreme caution.
Fortified enemy base camps and bunker complexes were common in VC/NVA controlled areas. The enemy tended to move from base camp to base camp to exert their control over an area and to facilitate their offensive and defensive operations. Battalion-size units tended to be nomadic, moving at night from one camp to another every few days. When not occupied by a main force unit, the enemy sometimes left a few caretakers at the unoccupied base camps. The units of the Dong Nai Regiment operating in War Zone D generally adhered to this doctrine.
Enemy sightings continued throughout the afternoon of 5 December. LRP Team 27 reported finding a company size bunker complex northwest of Fire Base Nashua, and a ground element from 3/17th Cav reported finding bunkers, tunnels, and spider holes near where Sergeant Alexander’s LRP team had made contact earlier in the day. Even more disturbing was an intelligence report disseminated by the Brigade TOC which indicated that a force of 250 VC armed with three 82mm mortars, a .50 caliber machine gun, two 60mm mortars, and a 75mm recoilless rifle had been spotted about six kilometers southeast of Nashua. According to an agent report, the enemy formation planned to attack the South Vietnamese Tan Uyen District Headquarters. There was no doubt that Schroeder’s battalion was positioned right in the middle of an enemy-controlled area. The next 24 hours would determine if Schroeder’s Warriors or the enemy’s Dong Nai Regiment would control that area.
Shortly after 1500 hours on 5 December, Major Maus extracted the last of his five LRP teams from the AO. An hour later an air strike was called in on a company-size base camp they’d found northwest of Nashua. Only one VC was spotted in the vicinity of the camp; nevertheless, it was deemed prudent to deny its future use to the enemy. The Air Force F-100s dropped eight 750-pound bombs, destroying the bunkers, and then followed up with 20mm cannon fire.
The LRPs had done their job, locating two enemy bunker complexes and reporting over 40 enemy sightings, but they missed the biggest prize of all. An enemy battalion sat undetected in a base camp under triple canopy jungle only two kilometers southeast of FSB Nashua. While the grunts of the 4/12th Infantry prepared for their second night at Nashua, the enemy battalion finalized its plans for the day to follow. The mortar attack on Nashua on the morning of December 6 was the invitation to the Warrior battalion to come find them. The enemy commander knew that the Americans would do a shell crater analysis at the points of impact, and determine the direction from where they’d been fired. The enemy battalion was ready for a fight.
CHAPTER 3
THE BLOODIEST DAY
6 December 1967
The VC unit occupying the fortified base camp near Firebase Nashua was a battalion of the Viet Cong main force Dong Nai Regiment. The regiment was composed of three maneuver battalions, designated K1, K2, and K3. In December 1967, the regiment’s strength was estimated at 2,200 men. In addition to preparing for the Tet Offensive scheduled for the end of January 1968, the regiment wa
s also responsible for safeguarding storage and base areas in the vicinity of FSB Nashua. It was augmented by local VC organized into a Rear Service Group. Since some of the enemy soldiers spotted and engaged by the LRPs and 3/17th Cav were clad in khaki uniforms, it is very probable that the Dong Nai Regiment was receiving NVA regulars to fill its ranks. Malnutrition and malaria, along with US air attacks, had taken a toll on the regiment over the preceding months. By early December, the battle-tested Dong Nai Regiment was undergoing a rapid build-up of men and supplies in War Zone D in preparation for a major offensive. An active defense of their base areas around FSB Nashua was a top priority.
The 105mm artillery and 81mm mortar counterbattery fires had little if any effect on the enemy. Hunkered down in bunkers dug deep below ground with overhead cover consisting of logs and dirt up to two feet thick, the enemy soldiers were at minimum risk from the counterbattery fires. Their bunkers could take a direct hit from a mortar or 105mm round without killing those inside. Some of the rounds detonated overhead in the trees, resulting in even less damage.
The enemy base camp near FSB Nashua, like most VC and NVA jungle base camps, was constructed to withstand a ground assault, and the site was selected with great care. There was a dense overhead foliage in the form of double or triple canopy jungle to conceal the fortifications from the air. On the ground, the terrain clearly favored the defenders with excellent cover and concealment. The site also afforded the defenders some observation of an approaching force. This was accomplished by cutting one- or two-foot-wide lanes in the jungle that could also be used as firing lanes in front of the enemy bunkers and trenches. These paths were often mistaken by US soldiers for trails worn by small animals moving through the jungle. The base camp was constructed to allow for a 360 degree defense with an outer and inner ring of bunkers all connected by fighting trenches deep enough to provide cover and concealment to a crawling or crouching soldier. The trenches were dug in a zigzag or Z pattern to facilitate their defense even if the attackers managed to infiltrate them.