Days of Valor Read online

  Starlight scope An optical night vision scope

  TAC air U.S. Air Force fixed-wing tactical air support

  TF Task Force

  TOC Tactical Operations Center

  Top First Sergeant

  Tracer Ammunition containing a chemical composition to mark the flight of the projectile

  Track Armored personnel carrier or armored cavalry vehicle

  USARV U.S. Army Vietnam

  USMA United States Military Academy (West Point)

  VC Viet Cong

  VNAF Vietnamese Air Force (South)

  Warriors Nickname of the 12th Infantry

  Web gear Suspender like harness attached to a pistol belt from which a soldiers equipment is attached

  WIA Wounded in action

  WO Warrant Officer

  WP White phosphorous

  XO Executive officer

  PROLOGUE

  A mantle of pre-dawn darkness enshrouded the jungle around the fire base. Only the faintest streaks of light brightened the sky to the east. Specialist Cliff Kaylor of Charlie Company was on radio watch at his platoon command post (CP). The 20-year-old Ohio native finished heating his C-ration coffee in his canteen cup, and leaned against the sandbagged bunker to sip the brew and watch the day rise. Suddenly, mortar rounds began to fall near the helicopter landing pad on the far side of the battalion perimeter. He recalled, “It was like watching a thunderstorm from a distance.” Charlie Company and Alpha Company manned the outer perimeter of Fire Support Base (FSB) Nashua while Bravo Company manned the inner perimeter that protected the battalion headquarters and the howitzers of Charlie Battery, 2nd Battalion, 40th Artillery. FSB Nashua was still a work in progress. Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Bill Schroeder’s “Warriors” of the 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry had established the base only two days earlier, December 4, 1967.

  The shelling was not heavy and did minimal damage. Twenty to twenty-five mortar rounds, probably meant for the helicopters or the battalion CP bunker, missed their targets and exploded in the Alpha and Bravo Company defensive sectors. Like his counterpart in Charlie Company, PFC John Sayers of Alpha Company was standing radio watch outside his bunker when the barrage began. He had no time to reach the bunker. A mortar round impacted a few meters away from him, and searing hot shrapnel tore into his arm and hand. A tree that he was standing beside protected most of his body. PFC John Nawrot, also a member of Alpha Company, was dozing on top of his bunker and was not as fortunate. Nawrot was seriously wounded by the blast and was evacuated to a hospital in Japan for treatment of his wounds. Sayer’s and Nawrot’s platoon leader was more fortunate. Newly assigned First Lieutenant Wayne Morris was asleep on the ground ten meters from his bunker. He had been warned by his platoon sergeant Dan Garrison not to sleep in the open, but ignored the advice. It nearly cost him his life. As the first rounds impacted in his platoon’s area, Morris dashed to his bunker just ahead of the next salvo, narrowly escaping the blasts.

  Captain Eaton’s Bravo Company on the inner perimeter had just finished “stand-to” when the mortars rounds began to explode. Eaton stood outside his CP bunker as he prepared to make his rounds of the company perimeter. He took cover after the first round exploded. Specialist-four Allen Phillips followed the Captain’s lead and sprinted toward his bunker, but never got there. He was hit in the legs with multiple pieces of white-hot shrapnel.

  Five minutes after the mortar attack began it was over. Bleary-eyed cannoneers from the 2/40th Artillery, and mortar crews of the 4/12th ran to their sandbagged gun pits and began sighting their M102 towed howitzers and 81mm mortars on the suspected location of the enemy mortars. Captain Grinnel, the Charlie Battery commander, requested radar surveillance for the counter-battery mission, but there was none available. The artillery fire direction center computed the firing data for the counter-battery fire mission using a back azimuth to the target and an estimated range. At best, it would take a lucky shot to nail the enemy mortars and their crews, since they moved quickly to alternate firing locations after each mission.

  The howitzer crews loaded the 33-pound 105mm shells, slammed the breeches closed, and awaited the command to fire. Seconds later, the howitzers belched flame and smoke as the rounds left the tubes. The mortar crews dropped round after round into their mortar tubes adding to the crescendo. The explosions of impacting howitzer and mortar rounds reverberated through the jungle, shattering the morning calm. All told, the enemy drew three or four times the fire he delivered, but it was impossible to know if the counter-battery fires had destroyed their target.

  The commander of the 4/12th Infantry, LTC Bill Schroeder, USMA 1952, had five months of command behind him on the morning of December 6, 1967. The lean and fit 36-year-old was no stranger to Vietnam, having been one of the first US military advisers assigned to the country. When he arrived in Saigon in 1961, Schroeder was assigned as senior advisor to the Vietnamese Airborne Division’s 6th Battalion at Vung Tau. He understood the Vietnamese including their culture and language, and this coupled with his tactical acumen made him a highly effective battalion commander. The present author, who was the Charlie Company commander in Schroeder’s battalion, recalls that he had a very professional, calm demeanor. Roberto Eaton, Bravo Company commander, described him as “Absolutely the best. He was a fighting commander who knew his stuff…. He understood the strain and danger that the common soldier lived on, especially when on point.” It was not out of character for LTC Schroder to land his C&C helicopter and walk with a line company on a mission. His men would follow him to hell and back if he asked.

  The mortar attack did not disturb Schroeder’s calm and deliberate demeanor. As the battalion radio operator, Specialist Pancho Ramirez, took the casualty reports from the rifle companies, Schroeder huddled with his S-3 Operations Officer, Major Ed King, and his S-2 Intelligence Officer, Captain Stone, readjusting the rifle company missions for the day. The officers had no inkling that 6 December 1967 would be the bloodiest day of the war for the Warrior battalion, and a prelude for the nationwide carnage to come.

  CHAPTER 1

  WHAT CAME BEFORE

  The 4/12th Infantry was assigned to the 199th Light Infantry Brigade (LIB). The battalion’s regimental affiliation was with the storied 12th Infantry Regiment, nicknamed the “Warriors.” The men who served in the 4/12th in Vietnam shared a revered heritage with other brave men who had fought with the regiment in previous wars. The 12th Infantry traced its lineage back to the Civil War during which the regiment participated in twelve campaigns with the Army of the Potomac. The Warrior regiment fought with distinction at Antietam, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, and Gettysburg, and finished the war in the blood-soaked trenches of Petersburg. Following the Civil War, the 12th Infantry participated in the Indian Wars, the Spanish American War, and more recently in World War II.

  On D-Day, the Warriors of the 12th Infantry landed on Utah Beach with the 4th Infantry Division, and then fought their way through five European campaigns. During the Battle of the Bulge, the regiment was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation, the highest award for a unit participating in combat. During the Vietnam War, the 12th Infantry had more battalions deployed than any other infantry regiment. Two of its battalions, the 4th and 5th, were assigned to the 199th Light Infantry Brigade (LIB), while three other 12th Infantry battalions served with the 4th and 25th Infantry Divisions.

  The 4/12th Infantry joined the 199th LIB when the brigade was activated at Fort Benning, Georgia in June of 1966. It was one of three infantry battalions assigned to the brigade. The 2/3d Infantry, nicknamed the “Old Guard,” and the 3/7th Infantry, the “Cottonbalers,” were also assigned to the 199th LIB upon its activation. Six months later the brigade shipped out for Vietnam, arriving at Vung Tau on December 10, 1966.

  The 199th LIB spent most of its first year in-country securing and pacifying the area surrounding Saigon. When LTC Schroeder assumed command of the 4/12th in July of 1967, the battalion was in the closing phase of Operation Fairfax/Rang
Dong, a joint Revolutionary Development and Pacification program in which US and Army of Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces were intermixed to form a combined forces team. The objective of the operation was to secure and pacify the countryside surrounding the sprawling city of Saigon and its environs. Schroeder’s battalion was teamed with the 30th Vietnamese Ranger Battalion, and was assigned an area of operations (AO) centered on Thu Duc, north of Saigon. It was the type of mission that Bill Schroeder was well prepared for given his previous tour as an advisor to Vietnamese forces and his considerable skills as a trainer.

  LTC Bill Schroeder was a second generation Army officer who grew up on Army posts around the world. He was born in Tientsin, China in 1929, the son of Army sergeant in the 15th Infantry Regiment. Schroeder’s father had joined the Army at 15 and served in World War I. At the outbreak of World War II, Schroeder’s father was commissioned in the Army Air Corps, and retired after the war with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. There was never much doubt about which career Bill Schroeder would pursue. After graduating from high school he joined the Army, took the US Military Academy admissions test, and received an appointment to West Point. He graduated in the class of 1952. With an airborne infantry and Special Forces background, and a previous tour as an advisor to ARVN forces, Bill Schroeder was well qualified to command an infantry battalion in combat.

  LTC Schroeder turned each operation into a learning experience for his troops. He never missed an opportunity to make on-the-spot corrections when he saw something he didn’t like, but he always made them in a calm and even-tempered manner. On one occasion, when a company commander was having difficulty navigating in some rough terrain, Schroeder landed his helicopter, and gave the Captain a quick course on how to properly “shoot an azimuth,” and move on a compass heading. Schroeder also debriefed his officers and NCOs on a regular basis, and distributed a series of “Commanders Notes” on subjects like ambush procedures, marking of helicopter landing zones, booby traps, treatment of POWs, communication procedures, and daylight and night movement. His purpose was to save as many lives as possible. Soon after he took command, his subordinates and superiors alike recognized that his leadership was making a difference in the battalion.

  Schroeder’s battalion was highly successful during Operation Fairfax. Viet Cong influence over the villages and hamlets surrounding Thu Duc began to decline as a result of the joint operations conducted by the 4/12th Warriors and the ARVN Rangers. By August 1967, the 4th VC Local Battalion was assessed as ineffective in the Thu Duc District, and intelligence reports suggested that it had departed the district for training and refitting.

  On August 7th, Schroeder’s Echo Company and a company from the 30th ARVN Ranger Battalion conducted an integrated airmobile assault in the Hoc Mon District, engaging an estimated VC Company on the landing zone (LZ). Five UH-1D helicopters were shot down during the combat assault and the Echo Company Commander was killed. After a tough fight to secure the LZ, Schroeder’s mixed force regrouped and attacked the dug- in enemy force driving them from their positions. Twenty-two VC were killed and nine were taken prisoner by Schroeder’s men. Another casualty of this battle was the 199th Brigade Commander, Brigadier General “Fritz” Freund, who was severely wounded when he landed his C&C ship on the “hot” LZ to evacuate casualties. Freund was evacuated to the States, and Lieutenant General Fred Weyand, the II Field Force Commander, looked around for a replacement. Fortunately, he had a qualified candidate close at hand.

  Brigadier General Robert C. Forbes was General Weyand’s Chief of Staff at II Field Force Headquarters. Forbes had held the position since February 1967, and had earned Weyand’s trust and confidence. Prior to his assignment to II Field Force, Forbes was the Assistant Division Commander of the 9th Infantry Division, one of three divisions under Weyand’s command. Without question, Forbes’ reputation in Vietnam was firmly established. He was also well connected with the Army’s hierarchy. Forbes joined the Army in 1939 after graduation from the University of Pennsylvania. He served with distinction in World War II and Korea, and later served multiple tours in the Pentagon. Forbes was known personally by a number of the Army’s four star generals. There was no one close at hand who surpassed Forbes qualifications for the job, and he assumed command of the 199th LIB on 4 September 1967.

  Later that month, Schroeder’s men killed the battalion commander of the Viet Cong’s 4th Local Force Battalion in Thu Duc effectively breaking the back of that unit’s operations in the district. By mid-October, the 30th Ranger Battalion was declared fully combat ready by the new 199th LIB commander, Brigadier General Forbes, and Schroeder’s 4/12th Infantry began to phase out of Operation Fairfax.

  Forbes was anxious to conclude Operation Fairfax. He sincerely believed that the ARVN Rangers were completely competent, and were ready to be cut loose from their American support in order to assume full responsibility for the defense of Saigon. Moreover, he was concerned that his combat brigade was being tied down in a relatively inactive area and was gradually losing its combat edge.

  After a series of briefings and discussions with his superiors, including General Westmoreland, Forbes gained approval for a plan to move the center of gravity of the 199th LIB north into the southwestern portion of War Zone D. There was, however, one proviso. The 199th LIB had to remain close enough to the Saigon defensive area to respond if the city was threatened.

  War Zone D was a large, sparsely populated area north of Saigon, Long Binh, and Bien Hoa. The area was used by the Communists to train, rest, and stage troops through. Additionally, it was a significant logistical base area for the enemy. During the late summer and early fall of 1967, intelligence reports indicated that enemy activity in the area was on the increase. Aerial observers reported numerous enemy sightings, including the movement of 2-1/2-ton Russian-made trucks through the area. The enemy was clearly up to something, but at the time, no one realized that the build-up was in preparation for a major nationwide offensive scheduled to take place during the Tet holiday at the end of January 1968.

  In fact, the decision to launch a nationwide offensive during the Tet holiday period was made by the Communist leadership in Hanoi in July 1967. The following six months were spent preparing for the general offensive. Military preparations were in high gear by the fall of 1967.

  Replacements, many newly arrived from North Vietnam, were assigned to Viet Cong Main Force battalions and regiments, and local units. Communist plans for the Tet Offensive called for these units to be the first wave “shock troops” in the attacks on the population centers of Saigon and Bien Hoa, and the US base camps and logistic centers at Long Binh. A reorganization of the communication and transportation networks stretching from the Cambodian border to the Saigon, Bien Hoa, and Long Binh areas was also underway. A vital part of these networks stretched eastward from the Cambodian border through War Zone C and on to War Zone D. Rest stations were established every four to eight hours’ march along these infiltration routes. A steady stream of supplies, small arms ammunition, 122 mm rockets and mortar shells, and men flowed along these routes throughout the fall of 1967. Every indigenous means of transportation was called into service including bicycles, ox carts, and civilian and military trucks to preposition supplies within striking distance of the enemy’s objectives for the Tet Offensive.

  Brigadier General Forbes selected an area north and northeast of Tan Uyen between the Song Be and Song Dong Nai Rivers, as the first area to be searched. That area had been under the control of the Communists since 1948. From firing sites in the southern portion of this area, the VC and NVA could launch 122mm rockets into the strategically important Bien Hoa airbase, and the huge Army base and logistic complex at Long Binh. More worrisome was the fact that enemy ground troops staging from this area could reach the same targets in a day or two.

  Although the U.S. 1st Infantry Division spent a limited period of time in the area, it was never thoroughly searched by U.S. troops. Forbes wanted to move in and destroy any enemy forces ope
rating in the area. He also wanted to find and destroy enemy weapons and ammunition caches, particularly the 122mm rockets and their launchers that were used to bombard the U.S. Long Binh/Bien Hoa base complex. The 199th LIB’s rear base installation, Camp Frenzell-Jones, was located within this complex along with the II Field Force Headquarters, USARV Headquarters, and a number of other unit headquarters.

  To accomplish this new mission, the 199th Commander planned to establish a fire support base (FSB) in the area of operations (AO) to support the ground troops as they searched the area. A 105mm artillery battery and a 155mm artillery battery would displace to the base. Forbes believed that by putting infantry on the ground in the enemy sanctuary, he could interdict the enemy’s infiltration routes and inflict major damage on their logistical support.

  Brigadier General Forbes selected the 4/12th Infantry to be the first of his three infantry battalions to relocate to War Zone D. Once Schroeder’s “Warriors” established a fire base in the area, they would be followed by LTC Gibler’s 3/7th Infantry. The 2/3d Infantry under the command of LTC Poage was to remain in the Nha Be District south of Saigon until mid-December, when the 199th LIB would complete the final phase of Operation Fairfax/Rang Dong.

  Forbes chose Schroeder’s battalion for the new mission because the battalion had significantly reduced enemy activity in Thu Duc District. He was also impressed with Schroeder’s calm, imperturbable manner and his professionalism. With five months of battalion command behind him, he was Forbes’ most battle-tested battalion commander. Both men knew that this new mission posed significant challenges and risks for the troops and their leaders.

  The initial deployment of only a single infantry battalion to the area was especially dangerous. Six weeks earlier, the 2/28th Infantry, the “Black Lions,” from the 1st Infantry Division were pounced on by an enemy regiment and lost the better part of two infantry companies and most of the battalion command group in an area less than twenty miles to the northwest of the AO selected by Forbes. The “Black Lions” fought bravely, but were badly outnumbered by a regiment of the 9th VC Division. Lieutenant Colonel Terry Allen Jr., the battalion commander and son of the famed World War II general, was killed along with fifty-seven of his men. Bill Schroeder and Terry Allen were classmates at West Point and later at the Army’s Command and General Staff College. Schroeder was well aware of what had happened to the “Black Lions” and his former classmate, and he knew that he was about to confront the same determined enemy.